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COMMAUNITY PROPERTY
Surrender Value of Community Insurance Subject to Inheritance
Tax. In In re Leuthold's Estate,' the Washington court held that the
cash surrender value of a life insurance policy, purchased with community funds, is a community interest of the non-insured spouse and
is property within the inheritance statute and, as such, subject to an
inheritance tax. The court expressly overruled the In re Knight's
Estate2 case.
The facts of the Leuthold case are as follows: Mrs. Leuthold died
testate, and the state attempted to impose an inheritance tax upon the
one-half interest in the cash surrender value of six life insurance policies on the life of her surviving spouse. All premiums paid prior to
the death of Mrs. Leuthold were paid with community funds. The
state contended Mrs. Leuthold owned a one-half interest in the policies, as community property, which she passed to her legatees, thereby
effecting a taxable event under the statute. The lower court, however,
held against the state on the authority of In re Knight's Estate. In
that case the court said, "even if the cash surrender value of a life
insurance policy be considered to be property, still it is not property
which passes by will or by the statute of inheritance."' (Emphasis by
the court.)
On appeal, the supreme court at first affirmed 4 but, on rehearing,
reversed the decision of the trial court.
Analysis of the insurance policies involved is necessary to understand the logic which led the court to adopt its new position. All were
level-premium, straight-life policies, the cash value of which increased
each year. This type of policy is dual in nature, having both indemnity
and investment features.'
The court pointed out that, as the premiums were paid with com152 Wn2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958).
2 31
3 52

Wn.2d 813, 199 P.2d 89 (1948).
Wn.2d 299, 301, 324 P.2d 1103, 1104 (1958), quoting In re Knight's Estate, 31
Wn.2d
813, 199 P.2d 89 (1948).
4
In re Leuthold's Estate, 150 Wash. Dec. 227, 310 P.2d 872 (1958).
5The court in the Leuthold case, quoting from pages 11 and 13 of Joseph B. McLean's treatise, Life Insurance, provides a more enlightening description of the principles underlying this type of policy: "[T]he level-premium plan, in fact, introduces an
entirely new element into the scheme of operation: the invested fund formed by the
excess payments. This fund is called the reserve, which is rather an unfortunate term
since it is really not a reserve in the ordinary commercial sense implying surplus but
is a fund which the company must maintain if it is to be able to pay all death claims
and without which it would be insolvent Moreover, the existence of this reserve causes
a radical change in the true amount and cost of insurance. Comparing a level-premium
plan with a yearly-renewable-term policy of the same face amount, we note that under
the former, when a policyholder dies, the accumulated reserve on his policy will, of
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munity funds, the life insurance policies were community personal
property, not mere expectancies or choses in action, at the time of
Mrs. Leuthold's death under the reasoning of Occidental Life Ins. Co.
v. Powers.'
The court then reasoned that the right to receive the cash surrender
value of the policy, being an incident of it, would also be community
property, following the analysis of Thompson v. Calvert,' a Texas case
with substantially the same fact pattern which sustained inclusion in
the deceased wife's estate for inheritance tax purposes of half the
cash value of life insurance policies on the husband's life. Citing the
cases of Poe v. Seaborn and Hopkins v. Bacon for the proposition
that the community property laws of the two states are substantially
the same with respect to the vested interests of the wife, the court then
described itself as "convinced that the rights of a wife in Washington,
with respect to community property, are as substantial as those of a
wife in Texas, and that the reasoning of the Texas court in Thomson
v. Calvert,... is sound, and that we should adopt it in this case."" 0
The court, with reference to its previous position, said: "[O]ur decision in In re Knight's Estate... was incorrect in holding that the cash
surrender value of a life insurance policy is not property 'which passes
by will or the statute of inheritance.' In our opinion, the state in this
case is taxing the receipt by Mrs. Leuthold's legatees, pursuant to her
will... and... is entitled to do so." "
Under the Leuthold case, the court has classified the cash surrender
value of insurance policies as another community asset arising from
contract and subject to the distribution qualifications placed on all
course, be available as a part of the 'face amount' payable. Consequently, as the reserve
increases, the insurance, or amount at risk (face amount less reserve), decreases. Thus
the increasing death rate is offset by a decreasing effective amount of insurance, and
the cost is kept down to a practicable figure.
"Investment in the Level-premium Plan. It is very important to note that under the
level-premium plan a policy of $1,000 does not give actual insurance of $1,000, (i.e.,
the company is never 'on the risk' for that amount) but only of $1,000 less the policyholder's own accumulated excess payments. It is thus evident, as already pointed out,
that the plan is not pure insurance but rather a combination of a decreasing insurance
with an increasing investment, the two amounts being computed mathematically in
such a way that in any year their sum is equal to the 'fact amount' payable under the
policy." In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wn.2d 299, 303, 324 P.2d 1103, 1106 (1958).
0 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937). See also In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn.2d 212,
155 P.2d 273 (1945) ; Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Perrigo, 47 Wn.2d 291, 287 P.2d
334 (1955) ; Itre Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938) ; Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
7301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
8 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
9282 U.S. 122 (1930).
10 52 Wn.2d 299, 308, 324 P2d 1103, 1109 (1958).
1I 52 Wn.2d 299, 309, 324 P.2d 1103, 1109 (1958).
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community property. Such a classification has the potential for creating rather complicated problems in the future.
On analysis, the interest of the non-insured spouse's heirs appears
to be a tenancy in common with the surviving spouse of a fractional
interest in the policy. A multiple ownership has come into existence
to replace the ownership formerly in the marital community. In the
case of insurance policies, the interest of the community is determined
by what proportion of the policy premiums were paid from community funds. 2 Since the valuation of policies, such as the ones under
consideration, at any time prior to the event when full payment
becomes due, is measured by the cash surrender value, it follows that
in the Leuthold case the deceased owned one-half of the total cash
surrender value at the time of her demise.
It should be noted, however, that what the heirs possess is an ownership of a fractional interest in the policy and that the cash surrender
value at the time of the passing of the interest is merely a convenient
way of calculating it. The importance of this lies in the fact the cash
surrender value is not a fixed amount, since it will continue to grow if
additional premiums are paid. Any additional premiums will not be
paid from community assets. Hence the heirs' percentage share ownership will gradually decline and the heirs can be described as tenants
in common in a progressively declining percentage of the asset (assuming the surviving spouse continues paying premiums).
The position of the husband, with respect to both the heirs of the
deceased wife and the insurance company, also presents a problem.
The husband, by contracting for the policy and paying all of the
premiums from community funds, in effect, made the community a
party to the contract with the insurance company. The husband was
an agent of the community and had a power to control the disposition
of the policies. 3 The proposition that the husband is only an agent
of the community is strengthened by Washington decisions such as
Marston v. Rue" and the Occidental 5 case, which curtail the husband's power to act independently with reference to the policies.'
12 In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938). Lang v. Commissioner,
304 U.S. 264 (1938).
23 RCVIT 26.16.030; Daniels v. Spear, 65 Wash. 121, 117 Pac. 737 (1911) ; Catlin v.
Mills, 140 Wash. 1, 247 Pac. 1013 (1926) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Skov, 51 F.
Supp. 470 (1943).
14 Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).
15 Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937).
"6E.g., National Bank of Commerce v. Lutheran Bhd., 40 Wn.2d 790, 246 P.2d 843
(1952) ; California Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Jarman, 29 Wn.2d 98, 185 P.2d
494 (1947).
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A problem is presented when, upon the demise of the wife, the community is dissolved. The surviving husband is then, as promisee of
the insurance contract, placed in the somewhat unique position of
appearing to have full power to make any disposition whatever of the
policy but, as against the wife's heirs, the right to do so only with his
vested half of what were previously community assets. At this point
there is no consent to be found between the estate or heirs of the wife
and the husband who holds the power. The husband is not an agent
for the heirs, although he appears to control their interest. He obviously is not an agent of the community, since it no longer exists. Is
his position that of constructive trustee? The answer is, as yet, undetermined, since the question has not been presented to the court.
As a matter of practicality, the husband may wish to escape the
responsibilities of a fiduciary and turn over the control of the portion
of the policy that belongs to the deceased to the heirs. If so, he may
ask the insurance company to split the policy. If the policy is split,
both the husband and the heirs will be able to do as they wish with
their respective shares.
The question of whether the heirs, without any power to control
the asset, though with a right to do so, can exert sufficient pressure
on the husband and legally force him to comply with their desires (at
least to the extent that their portion will be affected) is still unanswered.
RIcHARD W. SHELTON
Distinguishing Community and Separate Property. In re Bubb's
Estate, 153 Wash. Dec. 117, 331 P.2d 859 (1958). The petitioner
and the deceased, Mr. Bubb, were married in 1937 and separated in
1940. Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into a property settlement in which they agreed that all property standing in the name
of either party before marriage, together with any property acquired
after the date of the agreement, should remain and be the separate
property of the respective parties.
After the death of her husband, the petitioner brought an action
seeking to have the proceeds from a note belonging to the deceased
set aside in lieu of homestead, claiming that it was community property and not subject to the agreement. This note had been given to
the deceased by his step-daughter as evidence of a loan made some
eleven years after the property agreement was entered into. In order
to make the loan to his step-daughter, the deceased had to borrow from
a bank, giving the bank as security certain shares of stock which he
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had owned before the marriage to petitioner. In 1953, the deceased
paid off the bank loan, ostensibly from his own funds. At the time
of the decision, there was unpaid on the note from the step-daughter
the amount of $6,500.00; and it was from this amount that the
petitioner was seeking to recover $6,000.00 in lieu of homestead.
The court held that the property settlement agreement was binding on the parties and that the note from the step-daughter was
separate property and therefore subject to the agreement.
The court expressed two reasons for holding that the note constituted separate property. The first was that the source of the note,
the bank loan, was made on the deceased's separate credit. Granting
that the character of the loan from the bank will determine the character of the step-daughter's note, the question remains, why did the
court consider the bank loan as one based on the deceased's separate
credit?
In answering that question, the court might have pointed out that
in Washington, although, prima facie, a charge against the community
exists when a husband acquires an obligation, this presumption is
rebutted by satisfactory evidence of a separate property agreement,
such as the one the court, in this instance, found valid and binding.
Following this reasoning, the loan from the bank would have been
established as a separate obligation of the deceased. Piles v. Bovee
and Union Securities Co. v. Smith.1 Since the court did not urge this
rationale in their opinion, what was the reason which led it to the
conclusion that the bank loan was based on the deceased's separate
credit? Was it because the bank loan was secured by separate property? The case of Auernheimer v. Gardner2 would dispute such a
contention. Would the additional factor that the bank loan was
eventually paid off with separate funds be enough to make the note
separate property? Probably not, though it would make the argument stronger. The Washington case of In re Finn's Estate3 bears
upon this aspect.
Two other factors which might affect the determination of the character of the bank loan, though not discussed by the court, deserve
some attention at this point.
The first consideration overlooked was the presumption that the
husband in a maritai community is creating a community obligation
1 168 Wash. 538, 12 P.2d 914 (1932) ; 93 Wash. 115, 160 Pac. 304 (1916).
2177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
3 106 Wash. 137, 179 Pac. 103 (1919).
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when he obtains a loan. The Auernheimer case4 suggests that this is
so. The court did not discuss any such presumption; if the presumption applies and was not rebutted, the step-daughter's note should
certainly be considered community property, since it would then
represent funds loaned from the community account. What would
be needed to overcome the presumption that the husband created a
community obligation? Would the fact that the note was secured by
separate property do it? Again, the Auernheimer5 case suggests not.
Does the fact that, in addition to being secured by separate property,
the note was eventually paid off with separate funds, sufficiently rebut
the presumption? Since the court did not consider the point, this cannot be known.
The court might also have considered the fact that the petitioner and
the deceased were living apart and that both the bank loan and the
step-daughter's note were acquired after the separation. In Washington, the two cases of Togliatti v. Robertson' and In re Armstrong's
Estate' have held that property acquired after separation is individual
and separate. Would this also be true of an obligation? The court
did not consider this question.
The statement by the court that the money which the note from
the step-daughter represented was obtained on the deceased's separate credit suggests that the presumption of a community obligation
did not arise because the parties were living apart or, in the alternative, if such a presumption did arise, it was rebutted by the fact that
the deceased's separate property was used to secure the loan. The
latter conclusion would conflict with the Auernheimer case.'
The second reason the court gave for considering the step-daughter's note to be separate property was that it was directly traceable
to Mr. Bubb's separate property-his stock. Is this accurate? It
would have been clearer had the court said that, since the funds which
Mr. Bubb lent his step-daughter were those obtained from the bank
loan, the step-daughter's promissory note was directly traceable to
the bank loan, the character of which determined the nature of the
step-daughter's promissory note. The question of whether the bank
loan was intended to be a separate or community obligation would still
4 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934). See also Beyers v. Moore, 45 Wn.2d 68, 272
P2d 626 (1954) ; Meng v. Security State Bank, 16 Wn.2d 215, 133 P.2d 293 (1943);
and Morrison v. Dungan, 182 Wash. 503, 47 P.2d 988 (1935).
5 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
629 Wn.2d 844, 190 P2d 575 (1948)
33 Wn.2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (1949).
8 177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
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control, and the fact that the loan was secured by separate property
would not be enough to establish it as having the character of a
separate obligation, if the holding of the Auernheimer case' is to be
followed.
A method the court might successfully have employed in tracing
the note to the separate property would have been to show that the
bank, in making the loan to Mr. Bubb, was relying directly on the
security of the stock and not on the credit of Mr. Bubb, either as an
individual or as a member of the marital community. The fact that
the stock was his separate property undoubtedly would have led the
court to conclude that the bank loan was a separate obligation and
therefore, since that separate obligation was the source of the loan
to the step-daughter, her promissory note would also be his separate
property.
Assuming that the note was, in fact, the separate property of the
deceased, the solution of the court would be correct. The question
demains, what are the underlying bases for the conclusion that the
note was separate property? The answer is not apparent in the
RICHARD W. SHELTON
opinion.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Court Interpretation of the Power to Amend the Initiative. In
State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers' the court held that the legislature's
power to amend an initiative measure adopted by the electorate was
"unlimited" and included the power to repeal sections of the act, "to
alter, modify, take away or add to" the initiative "in such manner as
it saw fit," provided the "subject matter" remained the same.
As a result of the legislature's failure to apportion and redistrict the
membership of the state legislature since 1901,2 the people did so by
adopting initiative 199 at the 1956 general election.' Subsequently,
the legislature at the 1957 regular session apportioned and redistricted
by a different method in the form of chapter 289, an "amendment" to
initiative 199."
Both initiative 199 and chapter 289 were enacted in compliance
with that portion of article 2, section 3, of the state constitution which
'177 Wash. 158, 31 P.2d 515 (1934).
'51 Wn.2d 454, 464, 319 P.2d 828 (1957).
2 Laws of 1901, c. 60, at 79.
3 Laws of 1957, c. 5 at 11.

4 Laws of 1957, c. 289, at 147.

